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The Minority Game (MG) has become a paradigm to probe complex social and economical phenomena where
adaptive agents compete for a limited resource, and it finds applications in statistical and nonlinear physics as
well. In the traditional MG model, agents are assumed to have access to global information about the past
history of the underlying system, and they react by choosing one of the two available options associated with
a single resource. Complex systems arising in a modern society, however, can possess many resources so that
the number of available strategies/resources can be multiple. We propose a class of models to investigate MG
dynamics with multiple strategies. In particular, in such a system, at any time an agent can either choose a
minority strategy (say with probability p) based on available local information or simply choose a strategy
randomly (with probability 1 − p). The parameter p thus defines the minority-preference probability, which is
key to the dynamics of the underlying system. A striking finding is the emergence of strategy-grouping states
where a particular number of agents choose a particular subset of strategies. We develop an analytic theory
based on the mean-field framework to understand the “bifurcation” to the grouping states and their evolution.
The grouping phenomenon has also been revealed in a real-world example of the subsystem of 27 stocks in
the Shanghai Stock Market’s Steel Plate. Our work demonstrates that complex systems following the MG
rules can spontaneously self-organize themselves into certain divided states, and our model represents a basic
mathematical framework to address this kind of phenomena in social, economical, and even political systems.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minority Game (MG) was originated from the El Farol
bar problem in game theory first conceived by Arthur in 1994
[1], where a finite population of people try to decide, at the
same time, whether to go to the bar on a particular night. Since
the capacity of the bar is limited, it can only accommodate a
small fraction of all who are interested. If many people choose
to go to the bar, it will be crowded, depriving the people of the
fun and thereby defying the purpose of going to the bar. In this
case, those who choose to stay home are the winners. How-
ever, if many people decide to stay at home then the bar will be
empty, so those who choose to go to the bar will have fun and
they are the winners. Apparently, no matter what method each
person uses to make a decision, the option taken by majority
of people is guaranteed to fail and the winners are those that
choose the minority one. Indeed, it can be proved that, for the
El Farol bar problem there are mixed strategies and a Nash-
equilibrium solution does exist, in which the option taken by
minority wins [2]. A variant of the problem was subsequently
proposed by Challet and Zhang, named as an MG problem
[3], where a player among an odd number of players chooses
one of the two options at each time step. Subsequently, the
model was studied in a series of works [4–22]. In physics,
MG has received a great deal of attention from the statistical-
mechanics community, especially in terms of problems asso-
ciated with non-equilibrium phase transitions [23–25].
In the current literature, the setting of MG is that there is
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a single resource with players’ two possible options (e.g., in
the El Farol bar problem there is a single bar and the options
of agents are either going to the bar or not), and an agent
is assumed to react to available global information about the
history of the system by taking on an alternative option that
is different than the current one it is taking. The outstand-
ing question remains of the nonlinear dynamics of MG with
multiple resources. The purpose of this paper is to present a
class of multi-resource MG models. In particular, we assume
a complex system with multiple resources and, at any time,
an individual agent has k > 1 resources/strategies to choose
from. We introduce a parameter p, which is the probability
that each agent responds based on its available local infor-
mation by selecting a less crowded resource in an attempt to
gain higher payoff. We call p the minority-preference proba-
bility. We find, strikingly, as p is increased, the phenomenon
of grouping emerges, where the resources can be distinctly
divided into two groups according to the number of their at-
tendees. In addition, the number of stable pairs of groups also
increases. We shall show that the grouping phenomenon plays
a fundamental role in shaping the fluctuations of the system.
The phenomenon will be demonstrated numerically and ex-
plained by a comprehensive analytic theory. An application
to the analysis of empirical data from a real financial market
will also be illustrated, where grouping of stocks (resources)
appears. Our model is not only directly relevant to nonlinear
and complex dynamical systems, but also applicable to social
and economical systems.
Our multi-resource MG model is presented in Sec. II. The
emergence of grouping phenomenon is demonstrated in Sec.
III. A general theory is developed in Sec. IV to elucidate
the dynamics of the emergence and evolution of the strategy
groups. Concluding remarks are presented in Sec. VI.
2II. MULTI-RESOURCE MINORITY GAME MODEL
We consider a complex, evolutionary-game type of dynam-
ical system of N interacting agents competing for multiple
resources. Each agent will chose one resource in each round
of the game. And, each resource has a limited capacity, i.e.,
the number of agents it can accommodate has an upper bound
nc. There are thus multiple strategies (s = 1, 2, · · · , k, where
k is the maximum number of resources/strategies) available to
each agent. On average, each strategy can accommodate N/k
agents, and we consider the simple case of nc = N/k. Let
ns be the number of agents selecting a particular strategy s. If
ns ≤ nc, the corresponding agents win the game and, conse-
quently, s is the minority strategy. However, if ns > nc, the
associated resource is too crowded so that the strategy fails
and the agents taking it lose the game, which defines the “ma-
jority strategy.” The optimal solution to the game dynamics is
thus ns = nc.
In a real-world system, it is often difficult or even impossi-
ble for each agent to gain global information about the dynam-
ical state of the whole system. It is therefore useful to intro-
duce the concept of local information network in our multiple-
resource MG model. At each time step, with probability p,
namely the minority-preference probability, each agent acts
based on local information that it gains by selecting one of
the k available strategies. In contrast, with probability 1 − p,
an agent acts without the guidance of any local information.
For the minority-preference case, agent i has d neighbors in
the networked system. The required information for i to react
consists of all its neighbors’ strategies and, among them, the
winners of the game, i.e., those neighboring agents choosing
the minority strategies at the last time step. Let Π = {sm} be
the set of minority strategies for i’s winning neighbors, where
a strategy may appear a number of times, if it has been chosen
by different winning neighbors. With probability p, agent i
will chose one strategy randomly from Π. Thus, the probabil-
ity Ps for strategy s to be selected is proportional to the times
it appears in Π, i.e., Ps = Ns/Card(Π), where Card(Π) is
the number of elements in Π and Ns the times strategy s ap-
pears in Π. If Π is empty, i will randomly select one from
the k available strategies. While, for the case that an agent se-
lects a strategy without the guidance of any local information
with probability 1−p, it will either choose a different strategy
randomly from the k available ones with mutation probabil-
ity m [10], or inherit its strategy from the last time step with
probability 1−m.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
As a concrete example to illustrate the strategy-grouping
phenomenon, we set k = 5. Figures 1(a-c) show time se-
ries of ns, the number of agents selecting each strategy s, for
p = 0, 0.45, and 1.0, respectively. For Fig. 1(a) where p = 0,
an agent makes no informed decision in that it changes strat-
egy randomly with probability m but stays with the original
strategy with probability 1−m. In this case, ns’s appear ran-
dom. For the opposite extreme case of p = 1 [Fig. 1(c)], each
agent makes well informed decisions based on available lo-
cal information about the strategies used by its neighbors. In
this case, the time series are quasiperiodic (a detailed analy-
sis will be provided in Sec. IV). For the intermediate case of
p = 0.45 [Fig. 1(b)], agents’ decisions are partially informed.
In this case, an examination of the time series points to the oc-
currence of an interesting grouping behavior: the 5 strategies,
in terms of their selection by the agents, are divided into two
distinct groups g1 and g2 that contain kg1 = 2 and kg2 = 3
resources, respectively. The time series associated with the
smaller group exhibit larger fluctuations about its equilibrium.
To better characterize the fluctuating behaviors in the time
series ns, we calculate the variance σ2s = 〈[ns(t)−N/k]2〉 as
a function of the system parameter p, where 〈·〉 is the expec-
tation values averaged over a long time interval, as shown in
Fig. 2 on a logarithmic scale. We observe a generally increas-
ing behavior in σ2s with p and, strikingly, a bifurcation-like
phenomenon. In particular, for p < pb, where pb is the bifur-
cation point, σ2s for all strategies assume approximately the
same value. However, for p > pb, there are two distinct val-
ues for σ2, signifying the aforementioned grouping behavior
[Fig. 1(b)]. From Fig. 2, we also see that, after the bifurca-
tion, the two branches of σ2 are linear (on a logarithmic scale)
and have approximately the same slope a, suggesting the fol-
lowing power-law relation: σ2gi = bgip
a
, for i = 1, 2, where
log (bg1) and log (bg2) are the intercepts of the two lines in
Fig. 2. We thus obtain
σ2g1
σ2g2
=
bg1
bg2
. (1)
In Sec. IV, we will develop a theory to explain the relations
among the variances of the grouped strategies and to provide
formulas for the amplitudes of the time series in Fig. 1 and
the sizes of the groups (denoted by kg1 and kg2 , respectively).
Specifically, our theory predicts the following ratio between
the variances of the two bifurcated branches:
σ2g1
σ2g2
= (
kg2
kg1
)2, (2)
which is identical to the numerically observed ratio in Eq. (1),
with the additional prediction that the strategies in the group
of smaller size exhibit stronger fluctuations since the corre-
sponding value of σ2 is larger. Overall, the emergence of the
grouping behavior in multiple-resource MGs, as exemplified
in Fig. 2, resembles a period-doubling like bifurcation. While
period-doubling bifurcations are extremely common in non-
linear dynamical systems, to our knowledge, in complex game
systems a clear signature of such a bifurcation had not been
reported previously.
A careful examination of the time-series for various p
has revealed that the strategy-grouping processes has already
taken place prior to the bifurcation point pb in the variance
σ2, but all resulted grouping states are unstable. Take as an
example the 5-strategy system in Fig. 1. In principle, there
can be two types of pairing groups: (1, 4) and (2, 3). For any
grouping state, the following constraint applies:
kg1 + kg2 = k, kg1 · kg2 6= 0 (3)
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FIG. 1: (Color online.) (a-b) For a square-lattice system of N = 10000 agents, time series of the number of agents selecting each of the k = 5
available strategies for p = 0, 0.45, and 1.0, respectively. The probability of random alteration of strategy in the case of complete lack of local
information is set to be m = 1. A strategy grouping behavior can be seen in (b), where the whole strategy set is broken into two groups: one
of two and another of three strategies.
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FIG. 2: For the same system in Fig. 1, variance σ2 of the time series
ns as a function of p on a logarithmic scale. A period-doubling like
bifurcation occurs, at which a grouping behavior emerges. Inset is
the same plot but on a linear scale.
There are in total k/2 (if k is even) or (k − 1)/2 (if k is odd)
possible grouping states for the system with k available strate-
gies. However, the grouping states are not stable for p < pb.
What happens is that a strategy can remain in one group but
only for a finite amount of time before switching to a differ-
ent group. Assume that the sizes of the original two pairing
groups are (kg1 and kg2), respectively. The sizes of the new
pair of groups are thus (kg1 ± 1 and kg2 ∓ 1), as stipulated
by Eq. (3). Associated with switching to a different pair of
groups, the amplitudes of the time series ns for each strategy
also change. As the bifurcation parameter p is increased, the
stabilities of different pairs of grouping states also change. At
the bifurcation point pb, one particular pair of groups becomes
stable, such as the grouping state (2, 3) in Fig. 2.
The bifurcation-like phenomenon and the emergence of
various strategy-grouping states are general for multiple-
resource MG game dynamics. For example, Fig. 3 shows σ2
as a function of p for a system with k = 16 available strate-
gies. There are in total 8 possible grouping states, ranging
from (8, 8) to (1, 15). As p is increased, the grouping states
(8, 8), (7, 9), (6, 10), (5, 11) and (4, 12) become stable one af-
ter another, as can be seen from the appearance of their corre-
sponding branches in Fig. 3. The behavior can be understood
theoretically through a stability analysis (Sec. IV).
Another phenomenon revealed by Fig. 3 is the merging of
bifurcated branches. For example, as p is increased through
about 0.8, the grouping states disappear one after another in
the reverse order as they initially appeared. This can also be
understood through the stability analysis (Sec. IV).
IV. THEORY
Here we develop an analytic theory to understand the emer-
gence, characteristics, and evolutions of the strategy groups.
A. Relationship among variance, amplitude and group size
In general, for a multiple-resource MG system of N agents,
as the parameter p is increased so that agents become more
likely to make informed decision for strategy selection, the
available strategies can be divided into pairs of groups. The
example in Fig. 1(b) presents a case where there are two
distinct strategy groups g1 and g2, which contain kg1 and
kg2 strategies, respectively, where kg1 + kg2 = k. For Fig.
1(b), we have kg1 < kg2 . The strategies belonging to the
same group are selected by approximately the same number
of agents, i.e., the time series ns(t) for strategies in the same
group are nearly identical. During the time evolution, a strat-
egy s can switch iteratively from being a minority strategy
[ns(t) < nc ≡ N/k] to being a majority one [ns(t+1) > nc].
In particular, as shown in the schematic map in Fig. 4, for the
strategy in group g1 denoted by si, and the strategy in group
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FIG. 3: (Color online.) For a multiple-resource MG system of N = 10000 agents on a square lattice and k = 16 available strategies, (a)
numerically obtained bifurcation-like behavior that leads to the emergence of various pairs of grouping states [e.g, (8,8), (4,12), etc.], (b)
predicted bifurcation from mean-field theory (Sec. IV), and (c) results from an improved mean-field theory (Sec. IV). The probability of
random selection in the absence of local information is set to be m = 1.
 
  
 
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
400
600
800
1000
 
n S
(t)
time step
nSj
nSi
ASi
ASj
<nSi>
<nSj>
N/K
FIG. 4: For the case of two groups [e.g., Fig. 1(b)], schematic illus-
tration of time series nsi in group g1 (blue circles) and nsj in group
g2 (red triangles), where various quantities such as the amplitude A
are labeled.
g2 denoted by sj , if nsi(t) < N/k < nsj (t), we will have
nsi(t + 1) > N/k > nsj (t + 1). In addition, the time series
ns reveals that the average numbers of agents for strategies
si and sj , denoted by 〈nsi〉 and 〈nsj 〉 (the blue dash line and
red dot line in Fig. 4), respectively, are not equal to N/k (the
black solid line in Fig. 4). In fact, we have
〈nsi〉 =
N
k
+∆nsi , 〈nsj 〉 =
N
k
−∆nsj (4)
with 〈nsi〉 > N/k, and 〈nsj 〉 < N/k. Here, ∆nsx is the
absolute value of the difference between 〈nsx〉 and N/k. The
number of agents nsi(t) [or nsj (t)] typically fluctuates about
the equilibrium 〈nsi〉 [or 〈nsj 〉] with amplitude Asi [or Asj ],
as shown in the schematic map in Fig. 4.
Based on the numerical observations, we can argue that
the strategy grouping phenomenon is intimately related to the
fluctuations in the time series ns. Assuming the MG system
is closed so that the number of agents is a constant, we have
kg1 · nsi(t) + kg2 · nsj (t) = N. (5)
Thus, for two consecutive time steps, we have,
kg1 · (〈nsi〉+Asi) + kg2 · (〈nsj 〉 −Asj ) = N,
kg1 · (〈nsi〉 −Asi) + kg2 · (〈nsj 〉+Asj ) = N. (6)
Substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (6), we have
kg1 · (
N
k
+∆nsi +Asi) + kg2 · (
N
k
−∆nsj −Asj ) = N,
kg1 · (
N
k
+∆nsi −Asi) + kg2 · (
N
k
−∆nsj +Asj ) = N,
from which we obtain the relations between Asi and Asj ,
∆nsi and ∆nsj as
Asi
Asj
=
kg2
kg1
,
∆nsi
∆nsj
=
kg2
kg1
. (7)
We see that the fluctuations of the time series are closely re-
lated the grouping of the strategies.
From the definition of σ2s , we can write the variances of nsi
and nsj as
σ2si =
(Asi +∆nsi)
2 + (Asi −∆nsi)
2
2
= A2si +∆n
2
si
,
σ2sj =
(Asj −∆nsj )
2 + (Asj +∆nsi)
2
2
= A2sj +∆n
2
sj
.
Using Eq. (7), we obtain
σ2si
σ2sj
= (
kg2
kg1
)2. (8)
As shown in Fig. 2, the ratio of the variances of group g1 and
g2 from the simulation agree very well with Eq. (8).
5B. Mean-field theory
We develop a mean-field theory to understand the fluctua-
tion patterns of the system. To be concrete, we still treat the
case of two distinct groups. Consider strategy si that belongs
to group g1 and assume that si is the majority strategy at time
t = t0, i.e., n(0)si > N/k. According to the mean-field approx-
imation, at the next time step t = t0+1, the number of agents
n
(1)
si choosing strategy si is
n(1)si = n
(0)
si
− (w1 + w2) + w3
= n(0)si − [n
(0)
si
p+ n(0)si (1− p)m
k − 1
k
]
+ (N − n(0)si )(1− p)m
1
k
, (9)
where
w1 = n
(0)
si
p,
w2 = n
(0)
si
(1− p)m
(k − 1)
k
,
w3 = (N − n
(0)
si
)(1 − p)m
1
k
. (10)
Here, w1 and w2 together are the number of agents abandon-
ing strategy si (or the flow out of strategy si). That is, of the
n
(0)
si agents, w1 agents will act based on local information by
selecting a minority strategy different than si for the next time
step t0 + 1. At the same time, there will be w2 agents acting
without local information by choosing randomly one of the
other k − 1 strategies. The quantity w3 represents the flow
into si from the remainingN −n(0)si agents. These agents will
mutate randomly to switch their strategies to si without any
local information. We thus have
n(1)si = n
(0)
si
(1 − p)(1−m) +N(1− p)m
1
k
. (11)
Suppose n(1)si < N/k. Then si and the other kg1 −1 strategies
in g1 are the minority strategy, and the agents selecting those
strategies win the game at t = t0 + 1. The time series n(2)si at
time t0 + 2 can be written as
n(2)si = n
(1)
si
− n(1)si [p
(kg1 − 1)
kg1
+ (1− p)m
(k − 1)
k
]
+ (N − n(1)si )[p
1
kg1
+ (1− p)m
1
k
]
= n(1)si − (w4 + w5) + (w6 + w7), (12)
where w4 and w5 stand for the flows out of strategy si, while
w6 and w7 represent the flows into si from those N − n(0)si
agents on other strategies. We have
n(2)si = n
(1)
si
(1− p)(1−m) +N(1− p)m
1
k
+Np
1
kg1
, (13)
where n(2)si is larger than N/k, si and all other strategies in
group g1 will be the majority strategy again, as at time t0.
The process nsi → n
(1)
si → n
(2)
si thus occurs iteratively. From
Eqs. (11) and (13), we can get the number of agents for one
given strategy at any time t. In particular, denoting α ≡ (1 −
p)(1−m), β ≡ N(1−p)m/k, and γg1 ≡ Np/kg1 , we obtain
the iterative dynamics for agents selecting strategy si as
n(1)si = αn
(0)
si
+ β, (14)
n(2)si = αn
(1)
si
+ β + γg1 ,
n(3)si = αn
(2)
si
+ β,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
n(2a)si = αn
(2a−1)
si
+ β + γg1 ,
n(2a+1)si = αn
(2a)
si
+ β,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
where a ∈ R and n(t
′)
si stands for the number of agents at
t = t0 + t
′
. Carrying out the iterative process in Eq. (14), we
obtain
n(2)si = α
2n(0)si + αβ + β + γg1 ,
n(3)si = α
2n(1)si + αβ + αγg1 + β.
For the case where ns(t) exhibits stable oscillations, i.e., the
system is in a stationary state, we have,
n(0)si = n
(2)
si
= · · · = n(2a)si a ∈ R,
n(1)si = n
(3)
si
= · · · = n(2a+1)si .
We thus obtain the values of n(2a)si and n
(2a+1)
si as a function
of the probability p, mutation probabilitym, and the grouping
parameter kg1 , and k:
n(2a)si =
αβ + β + γg1
1− α2
,
n(2a+1)si =
αβ + αγg1 + β
1− α2
. (15)
From ns, we can get the expression of the amplitude of the
fluctuation, the mean value 〈nsi〉, and its difference fromN/k
as,
Asi = [n
(2a)
si
− n(2a+1)si ]/2 =
γg1
2(1 + α)
,
〈nsi〉 = [n
(2a)
si
+ n(2a+1)si ]/2 =
2β + γg1
2(1− α)
,
∆nsi = |〈nsi〉 −N/k| = |
kγg1 − 2Np
2k(1− α)
| =
Np|k/kg1 − 2|
2k(1− α)
.
In the above derivation, we have assumed that si belongs to
group g1, and obtained expressions of the nsi , Asi , 〈nsi〉, and
∆nsi . Similarly, using Eq. (5), we can calculate the time se-
ries nsj , the number of agents selecting the strategy sj belong-
ing to group g2, and the corresponding characterizing quanti-
ties.
Alternatively, following the steps similar to those from Eqs.
(9) to (14), we can write the recurrence formula for nsj as
n(2a)sj = αn
(2a−1)
sj
+ β,
n(2a+1)sj = αn
(2a)
sj
+ β + γg2 ,
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FIG. 5: (Color online.) Comparison of the time series of nsi in
group g1 (and nsj in group g2) from the mean-field formula [Eq.
(15)] and modified mean-field formula [Eq. (18)], and from simula-
tions. The upper and lower figures show the results for the grouping
state (8, 8) and (7, 9), respectively. The left panels are the results
from mean-field theory (MF) and from simulations on fully con-
nected networks (FCN). The right panels are the results from our
modified mean-field theory (MMF) and simulations on the square lat-
tice (SL). The system parameters areN = 10000, k = 16, p = 0.45,
and m = 1.
where γg2 = Np/kg2 . For the case of stable strategy, we get
the corresponding number of agents as
n(2a)sj =
αβ + αγg2 + β
1− α2
,
n(2a+1)sj =
αβ + β + γg2
1− α2
. (16)
We find that the values of ns obtained from Eq. (16) agree
with those from Eq. (5) very well (derivation and data not
shown). In addition, the expressions of Asj , 〈nsj 〉, and ∆nsj
are identical to those associated with si, with the quantity γg1
replaced by γg2 .
The mean-field theory is ideally suited for fully connected
networks. Indeed, results from the theory and direct simu-
lations agree with each other very well, as shown in Fig. 5.
However, in real-world situations, a fully connected topol-
ogy cannot be expected, and the mean-field treatment will no
longer be accurate. For example, we have carried out sim-
ulations on square-lattice systems and found noticeable de-
viations from the mean-field prediction. To remedy this defi-
ciency, we develop a modified mean-field analysis for MG dy-
namics on sparsely homogeneous networks (e.g., square lat-
tices or random networks).
C. Mean-field theory for MG dynamics on sparsely
homogeneous networks
Due to the limited number of links in a typical large-scale
network, it is possible for a failed agent to be surrounded by
agents from the same group (who will likewise fail the game).
In this case, the failed agent has no minority strategy to imitate
(set Π is empty) and thus will randomly select one strategy
from the k available strategies. Taking this effect into account,
we can modify the mean-field approximation in Eqs. (9) and
(12) as
n(1)si = n
(0)
si
− (w1 + w2) + w3 + w8, (17)
n(2)si = n
(1)
si
− (w4 + w5) + (w6 + w7) + w9,
with the two modified terms given by
w8 = kg1n
(0)
si
pηg1
1
k
,
w9 = (N − kg1n
(1)
si
)pηg2(
1
k
−
1
kg1
),
where ηgx is the probability for one agent in group gx to be
surrounded by agents from the same group. The quantity w8
stands for the flow from the failed agents in group g1 [the
number is Ng1 ≡ kg1n
(0)
si ], who react to the information [the
number is Ng1p] but with no winner surrounded to supply the
optional minority strategy [the number is Ng1pηg], and thus
select si with probability 1/k. The quantity w9 represent two
factors: (1) the n1 = (N − kg1n(1)si )p 1kg1 ηg2 failed agents in
group g2 who should have flow into si [i.e. w6] but are held
back because they are surrounded by agents in g2, and (2)
the failed agents in group g2 who are surrounded by agents
in g2 and thus select si with 1/k probability, the number of
which is n2 = (N − kg1n
(1)
si )pηg2
1
k
. Apparently, we have
w9 = n2 − n1.
From Eq. (17), we obtain
n(2a)si =
α′′g1β + β + γ
′
g1
1− α′g1α
′′
g1
, (18)
n(2a+1)si =
α′g1β + α
′
g1
γ′g1 + β
1− α′g1α
′′
g1
,
Asi =
(α′′g1 − α
′
g1
)β + (1− α′g1)γ
′
g1
2(1 + α′g1α
′′)
,
〈nsi〉 =
β(α′′g1 + α
′
g1
+ 2) + γ′g1(1 + α
′
g1
)
2(1− α′g1α
′′
g1
)
,
∆nsi = |
β(α′g1 + α
′′
g1
) + γ′g1(1 + α
′
g1
) + 2β
2(1− α′g1α
′′
g1
)
−
N
k
|,
where the parameters are
α′g1 = (1− p)(1−m) +
kg1pηg1
k
,
α′′g1 = (1− p)(1−m) + kg1pηg2(
1
k g1
−
1
k
),
γ′g1 = Np[
1
kg1
+ ηg2(
1
k
−
1
kg1
)].
The equation set (18) represents the modified mean-field de-
scription of the time series associated with the stable strate-
gies in the game system supported on sparsely homogeneous
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FIG. 6: (Color online.) Phase diagram indicating the stability region
of strategy-grouping states. The stable parameter region of one given
grouping state with kg1 = k′ is at the upper right of the correspond-
ing curve of k′.
networks. The density of agents in gx is denoted by ρgx ≡
Ngx/N . For the case where agents from different groups
are well mixed in the network, the probability for one given
agent in gx to meet with agents in gy is Pgxgy = ρgy (for
x, y = 1, 2). If the average degree of the network is d, the
probability that one agent from gx is surrounded by agents
from the same group is ηgx = (Pgxgx)d = ρdgx . From the
simulation on the square lattice system where each agent has
d = 4 neighbors, we observe a quite weak effect of clustering
of agents in g1 or g2, so ηgx ≈ ρ4gx = (Ngx/N)
4
. Based on
the quantity ηgx , analytic prediction of the time series in the
modified mean-field (MMF) theory can be obtained, as shown
in Fig. 5 for a square-lattice system. We observe a good agree-
ment with simulation results. Simulations on homogeneous
networks of different values d have also been carried out, with
results in good agreement with the prediction from the modi-
fied mean-field theory.
D. Stability of strategy grouping states
Our mean-field treatment yields formula characterizing
the stable oscillations associated with the grouping state
(kg1 , kg2 ), which include the variance ratio of the pairing
groups [Eq. (8)] and time series ns [Eqs. (15) and (18)]. How-
ever, from the simulation result shown in Fig. 3, we see that
not all the grouping states are stable in the parameter space.
As p is increased, the strategy-grouping state of the smaller
kg1 becomes stable, and the corresponding branch appears.
It is therefore useful to analyze the stability of the grouping
state.
In our treatment we have assumed n(0)si > N/k and n
(0)
sj <
N/k. Then, the necessary condition for the grouping state
(kg1 , kg2 ) to become stable is n
(1)
si < N/k and n
(1)
sj > N/k.
Using Eqs. (15) and (16), we get
kg1 >
k(1−m− p+ pm)
2−m− p+ pm
≡ ξ1(p,m), (19)
kg2 <
k
2−m− p+mp
≡ ξ2(p,m),
where ξ1 and ξ2 are continuous functions of the parameters p
and m, and ξ1 + ξ2 = k. The two inequalities in Eq. (19)
are nevertheless equivalent to each other. Figure 6 presents
a phase diagram in the parameter space, where the curves of
ξ1(p,m) = k
′ for k′ = 8, 7, · · · , 1 are shown. The necessary
condition for the strategy-grouping state with kg1 = k′ to be
stable is that the the parameters p and m are in the upper-
right region of the curve ξ1(p,m) = k′. For certain value
of m, only when p > pb(m, k′) will the state of kg1 = k′
be stable. While the value of pb from simulation is different
from the theoretical value pb(m, k′), our mean-field theory
does provide a qualitative explanation for the phenomenon in
Fig. 3(a), where more branches of smaller strategy-grouping
states become stable as p is increased.
We have also seen in Fig. 2, and Fig. 3(a) that, as p ap-
proaches 1, the bifurcated branches of different grouping state
merge together. For the case of even k, ns fluctuates stably in
the grouping state with kg1 = kg2 = k/2. While, for the case
of odd k, ns fluctuates quasiperiodicly [see Fig. 1(c)]. Actu-
ally, the grouping state always switches between (kg + 1, kg)
and (kg, kg+1), with kg = (k−1)/2. We can understand the
instability and merging of grouping states from Fig. 1(c), and
the schematic map in Fig. 4, as follows. As p is increased to 1,
∆nsi and ∆nsj increase and become comparable to the am-
plitudes Asi and Asj , respectively. Namely, the attendances
ns of strategies can be very close to nc = N/k . In case
that ns of one strategy does not get cross nc because of noise,
i.e., it acts as minority (or majority) strategy twice, then, the
fluctuation of ns, as well as the grouping state is changed.
V. A REAL-WORLD EXAMPLE: EMERGENCE OF
GROUPING STATES IN FINANCIAL MARKET
The financial market is a representative multi-resource
complex system, in which many stocks are available for in-
vestment. We analyze the fluctuation of the stock price from
the empirical data of 27 stocks in the Shanghai Stock Mar-
ket’s Steel Plate between 2007 and 2010. We regard the 27
stocks, which are derived from the iron and steel industry,
as constituting a MG system with k = 27 resources, where
the agents selecting the resources correspond to the capitals
invested. This system is open in the sense that capital typi-
cally flows in and out, which is the main difference from our
closed-system model. In particular, given the time series xi(t)
of the daily closing price of stock i, the daily log-return is
defined as Ri(t) = lnxi(t) − lnxi(t − 1). The average re-
turn of the 27 stocks at time t, denoted by 〈Ri(t)〉, signifies a
global trend of the system at t, which is caused by the change
in the total mount of the capital in this open, 27-stock sys-
tem. However, when we analyze the detrended log-returns
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FIG. 7: (Color online.) Correlation matrix of log-returns for 27 stocks in Shanghai Stock Market’s Steel Plate. (a) Original matrix C, (b)
matrix C′ ordered according to the eigenvector for the maximum eigenvalue of C, and (c) reordered matrix C′′ from C′ with respect to ci
within each group. The ci values of the stocks are shown for each matrix.
R′i(t) = Ri(t) − 〈Ri(t)〉, the system resembles a closed sys-
tem, as our model MG system. We shall demonstrate that the
strategy-grouping phenomenon occurs in this real-world sys-
tem.
We calculate the Pearson parameter cij of each pair of the
detrended log-returnsR′i(t) and R′j(t), which leads to a k× k
correlation matrix C, as shown in Fig. 7(a). In terms of the
eigenvector associated with the maximum eigenvalue of ma-
trix C, we rank the order of the stocks and obtain the matrix
C′, as shown in Fig. 7(b). The striking behavior is that the ma-
trix is apparently divided into 4 blocks, a manifestation of the
grouping phenomenon. In particular, the matrix elements cij
among the first 15 stocks and those among the remaining 12
stocks are generally positive, but the cross elements between
stocks in the two groups are negative. It is thus quite natural
to classify the first 15 stocks as belonging to group g1 and the
remaining 12 to group g2. We can then write the matrix in a
block form as
C′ =
(
Cg2g1 Cg2g2
Cg1g1 Cg1g2
)
,
where the elements of Cg1g1 and Cg2g2 are positive, and those
of Cg1g2 and Cg2g1 are negative. The phenomenon is that
the 27-stock system has self-organized itself into a (12, 15)
grouping state, which is a natural consequence of the MG dy-
namics in multi-resource complex systems.
For one given stock i, the mean absolute correlation is
ci =
k∑
j=1
|cij |/(k − 1), j 6= i.
This parameter reflects the weight of the stock in the system.
If ci → 0, oscillations of stock i are contained in the noise
floor. In this case, there is no indication as to whether this
stock belongs to group g1 or g2. The larger the value of ci,
the less ambiguous that the stock belongs to either one of the
two groups. From the value of ci ranked in the same order
as in C′, we can see that the boundary of the two groups is
the stock with minimum ci. Thus ci can be considered as the
characteristic number to distinguish different groups. We can
also reorder the matrix C′ according to ci within group g1 and
g2, respectively. This leads to the matrix C′′, as shown in Fig.
7(c), further demonstrating the grouping phenomenon.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
Minority game, since its invention about two decades ago,
has become a paradigm to study the social and economical
phenomena where a large number of agents attempt to make
simultaneous decision by choosing one of the available op-
tions [2]. In the most commonly studied case of a single avail-
able resource with players’ two possible options, agents tak-
ing the minority option are the guaranteed winners. Various
minority game dynamics have also received attention from the
physics community due to their high relevance to a number
of phenomena in statistical physics. It has become more and
more common in the modern world that multiple resources
are available for various social and economical systems. If
the rule still holds that the winning options are minority ones,
the questions that naturally arise are what type of collective
behaviors can emerge and how they would evolve in the un-
derlying complex system. Our present work aims to address
these questions computationally and analytically.
The main contribution and findings of this paper are the
following. Firstly, we have constructed a class of spatially
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FIG. 8: (Color online.) (a) The analytical time series ns(t) of period-tripling in the form of 2 groups, and (b) the corresponding mapping
from nsi(t) to nsi(t + 1) for the strategy si in group g1 [see Eq. (17)]. The system is of k = 16, p = 0.25, m = 0.2, and the grouping
state (kg1 , kg2) is (3, 13), respectively. (c) The time series ns(t) of the stable grouping state with period-tripling in the form of 3 groups from
simulation on FCN. The system is of k = 16, p = 0.88, m = 1, and the grouping state (kg1 , kg2 , kg3) is (5, 5, 6).
extended systems in which any agent interacts with a finite
but fixed number of neighbors and can choose either to follow
the minority strategy based on information about the neigh-
boring states or to select one randomly from a set of avail-
able strategies. The probability to follow the local minority
strategy, or the probability of minority preference, is a key
parameter determining the dynamics of the underlying com-
plex system. Secondly, we have carried out extensive nu-
merical simulations and discovered the emergence of a strik-
ing collective behavior: as the minority-preference probabil-
ity is increased through a critical value, the set of available
strategies/resources spontaneously break into pairs of groups,
where the strategies in the same group are associated with a
specific fluctuating behavior of attendance. This phenomenon
of strategy-grouping is completely self-organized, which we
conjecture is the hallmark of MG dynamics with multiple
resources. Thirdly, we have developed a mean-field theory
to explain and predict the emergence and evolution of the
strategy-grouping states, with good agreement with the nu-
merics. Fourthly, we have examined a real-world system of
a relatively small-scale stock-trading system, and found un-
equivocal evidence of the grouping phenomenon. Our results
suggest grouping of resources as a fundamental type of collec-
tive dynamics in multiple-resource MG systems. Other real-
world systems for which our model is applicable include, e.g.,
hedge-fund portfolios in financial systems, routing issues in
computer networks and urban traffic systems. We expect our
model and findings to be not only relevant with statistical-
physical systems, but also important to a host of social, eco-
nomical, and political systems.
Additionally, the double-grouping (or paired grouping)
period-doubling like bifurcation are not the exclusive mode
for the grouping of resources. We have also observed
the period−3 double-grouping [see Fig. 8(a)(b)], and the
period−3 triplet-grouping bifurcation phenomena [see Fig.
8(c)]. Further research about these phenomena are of great
interest and is valuable for the understanding of chaotic and
bifurcation in social systems.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
ZGH thanks Prof. Matteo Marsili for helpful discussions.
This work was partially supported by the NSF of China
(Grant Nos. 10905026, 10905027, 11005053, and 11135001),
SRFDP No. 20090211120030, FRFCU No. lzujbky-2010-
73, Lanzhou DSTP No. 2010-1-129. YCL was supported by
AFOSR under Grant No. FA9550-10-1-0083.
[1] W. Brian Arthur, Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rational-
ity, Ame. Econo. Rev. 84, 406 (1994).
[2] H. Gintis, Game Theory Evolving (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 2009).
[3] D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang, Emergence of Cooperation and
Organization in an Evolutionary Game, Physica A 246, 407
(1997).
[4] D. Challet and M. Marsili, Phase Transition and Symmetry
Breaking in the Minority Game, Phys. Rev. E 60, R6271 (1999).
[5] D. Challet, M. Marsili and R. Zecchina, Statistical Mechanics
of Systems with Heterogeneous Agents: Minority Games, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 84, 1824 (2000).
[6] A. De Martino, M. Marsili and R. Mulet, Adaptive Drivers in a
Model of Urban Traffic, Europhys. Lett. 65, 283 (2004).
[7] C. Borghesi, M. Marsili and S. Micciche`, Emergence of Time-
horizon Invariant Correlation Structure in Financial Returns
by Subtraction of the Market Mode, Phys. Rev. E 76, 026104
(2007).
[8] R. Savit, R. Manuca, and R. Riolo, Adaptive Competition, Mar-
ket Efficiency, and Phase Transitions, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 2203
(1999).
[9] M. Paczuski, K. E. Bassler and A. Corral, Self-Organized Net-
works of Competing Boolean Agents, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 3185
(2000).
10
[10] T. Zhou, B.-H. Wang, P.-L. Zhou, C.-X. Yang and J. Liu,
Self-organized Boolean Game on Networks, Phys. Rev. E 72,
046139 (2005).
[11] V.M. Eguiluz and M.G. Zimmermann, Transmission of Infor-
mation and Herd Behavior: An Application to Financial Mar-
kets , Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5659 (2000).
[12] T. Kalinowski, H.-J. Schulz and M. Birese, Cooperation in the
Minority Game with Local Information, Physica A 277, 502
(2000).
[13] F. Slanina, Harms and Benefits from Social Imitation, Physica
A 299, 334 (2000).
[14] M. Anghel, Z. Toroczkai, K. E. Bassler and G. Korniss,
Competition-Driven Network Dynamics: Emergence of a
Scale-Free Leadership Structure and Collective Efficiency,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 058701 (2004).
[15] T. S. Lo, H. Y. Chan, P. M. Hui, and N. F. Johnson, Theory of
Networked Minority Game Based on Strategy Pattern Dynam-
ics, Phys. Rev. E 70, 056102 (2004).
[16] T. S. Lo, K. P. Chan, P. M. Hui and N. F. Johnson, Theory of En-
hanced Performance Emerging in a Sparsely Connected Com-
petitive Population, Phys. Rev. E 71, 050101(R) (2005).
[17] N. F. Johnson, M. Hart, and P. M. Hui, Crowd Effects and
Volatility in Markets with Competing Agents, Physica A 269,
1 (1999).
[18] M. Hart, P. Jefferies, N. F. Johnson and P. M. Hui, Crowd-
Anticrowd Theory of the Minority Game, Physica A 298, 537
(2001).
[19] D. Challet, A. De Martino and M. Marsili, Dynamical Instabili-
ties in a Simple Minority Game with Discounting, J. Stat. Mech.
(2008) L04004.
[20] G. Bianconi, A. De Martino, F.F. Ferreira, M. Marsili, Multi-
Asset Minority Games, Quant. Finance, 8(3):225-231, 2008.
[21] Y. B. Xie and B. H. Wang, C.-K. Hu and T. Zhou, Global Opti-
mization of Minority Game by Intelligent Agents, Eur. Phys. J.
B 47, 587 (2005).
[22] L.-X. Zhong, D. F. Zheng, B. Zheng, and P. M. Hui, Effects of
Contrarians in the Minority Game, Phys. Rev. E 72, 026134
(2005).
[23] E. Moro, The Minority Game: an Introductory Guide, in Ad-
vances in Condensed Matter and Statistical Physics, ed. by
E. Korutcheva and R. Cuerno (Nova Science Publishers, Inc.,
2004).
[24] D. Challet, M. Marsili and Y.-C. Zhang, Minority Games (Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 2005).
[25] C. H. Yeung and Y.-C. Zhang, Minority Games,
arXiv:0811.1479v2 (2008).
